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This research will comprehensively analyze the Kra Isthmus Canal’s 
agenda and its possible impacts on Thailand and also to some other 
countries in ASEAN, specifically for Indonesia. By employing descriptive 
and qualitative methods, this study will investigate two types of paradigm 
through documentation and literature review from several studies in the 
past. The results are expected to encourage Indonesia to be more agile in 
adjusting steps to become the world's maritime fulcrum and also to sharpen 
the state sovereignty in sea policy.  
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dan kajian pustaka dari beberapa penelitian sebelumnya. Hasil dari kajian 
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langkah untuk menjadi poros maritim dunia, dan menajamkan kebijakan 
laut nasional yang berdaulat. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia has been longing to become the world's maritime fulcrum. This 
aspiration is intimately related to the fact that Indonesia is geographically strategic; 
surrounded by two giant continental blocks and two vast oceans. The oceans and seas 
along the archipelago are remarkably astonishing, constitute many legitimate commercial 
shipping routes both on international (north-south) and domestic (east-west) levels. 
Indonesia's goals since then well sharpened with the geopolitical paradigm known as the 
Indonesian Archipelago Concept. This vital principle has long been set as the basis of 
maritime foundation in order to become a robust nation. However, the apparent 
challenges of geo-maritime in the state sectors are immensely dynamics. 
The international shipping industry network that crosses territorial seas 
connecting countries has long devised competitions and conflicts; they are acknowledged 
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as capable of maturing Indonesia's vision as the world's maritime fulcrum. For a simple 
instance, the Kra Isthmus Canal's agenda in Thailand. This Canal is an actual geopolitical 
subject and is regarded as a definite challenge. Concerning the advantages of streamlined 
routes, the Canal could propose better performance in terms of time, security, and budget 
efficiency. Mainland Thailand and its Gulf, the Andaman Sea, and the Straits of Malacca 
are situated between two vast spaces of oceans. If the agenda was turning out into real, 
this specific path is believed to be a vocal crossing track for international shipping 
industry together with the Malacca Straits, primarily in the Southeast Asia region 
(Saragih, 2018). 
For decades, the South China Sea is the leading transaction pathway of necessary 
logistics for manufacturing countries to and from West Asia, East Asia, and Southeast 
Asia. Several nations in Africa (Nigeria and Angola) are the largest exporters for many 
materials in the gas and energy sectors accompanied by the Middle East, which has long 
been a significant supplier and always still. Roughly a third of imports into Asia are 
liquefied natural gasses; Japan consumes crude oil by 80%, and 40% of total Chinese 
intake of crude oil is laid on hands by import activities (Karagiannis, 2010). The safety 
level of the shipping activities in the Indian Ocean region is forecasted to increase and 
further trouble the status of the Malacca Straits. Besides, the South China Sea 
controversy triggers many countries to find a new alternative pathway for better logistics 




This study analyzes secondary data by collecting literature reviews and some 
other supporting documents. Descriptive and qualitative methods are employed to study 
the geo-maritime side of the Kra Isthmus Canal and Indonesia's maritime routes. This 
research will highlight and complement preceding studies by focusing on two geo-
maritime aspects: socio-economic and maritime global constellation.  
Besides focusing on the Canal’s impact towards Indonesia’s economy and marine 
policy, this research will also examine its correlation to several countries in the ASEAN 
region such as Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Singapore, and Vietnam. Therefore, by 
analyzing the Canal’s agenda in the future, the outcome is expected to comprehend and 




The geo-maritime paradigm was first introduced in 2015 by the Indonesian 
Geography Association (IGA). At the same moment, the maritime concept also became 
the attention on the international stage. The geo-maritime paradigm in a geographic 
perspective emphasizes six objects: (1) historical maritime, (2) maritime resources, (3) 
socio-economic maritime, (4) maritime culture, (5) geo-literation for maritime values, 
and (6) maritime global constellation. Germond (2014), defined four concepts in 
maritime security: human resilience, marine safety, sea power, and blue economy. By 
having an in-depth examination, the geo-maritime paradigms from a geographical 
perspective (IGA) have an ongoing direct connection with Germond's theory. 
Many earlier researchers have delivered individual/group studies or such 
literature investigations related to the Kra Isthmus Canal. Some of them focused on 
evaluating distinct impacts on different countries. A study conducted by Rahman et al. 
(2016), presented shipping industry patterns in Malaysia. Later, Harahap (2019), reported 
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how the Kra Isthmus Canal affect Indonesia’s economy. Earlier, Sulong (2012), 
discussed how the Kra Isthmus Canal affect international relations in Southeast Asia 
territory, including Indonesia. Meanwhile, from the spatial analysis purview, Chen and 
Kumagai (2016), conducted research using modeling techniques. The technique was 
making a simulation linked to economic impacts through the concepts and approaches 
from the spatial program (remote sensing technology). The research was supported by 
the Institute of the Japan External Trade Organization and was fascinating as it can 
predict the business and economics circumstances with a designated timeframe in the 
future. 
In the view of Harahap (2019), apart from the adverse impacts that might arise 
due to the Canal’s idea, Indonesia also has a chance to look for real opportunities if 
several ports in crucial areas were being optimized. For example, the Sabang Port in the 
Special Region of Aceh and the Kuala Tanjung Port in North Sumatra. If the two harbors 
were transformed into international-standard ports, their capacity and capability would be 
able to handle foreign vessels’ loading and unloading. Those harbors can be Indonesia's 
imperative hub-spots and become ardent rivals to Singapore Port's triumphant. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Geo-maritime Elements on the Kra Isthmus Canal 
The signature of the Kra Isthmus Canal is not a novelty; this design element has 
been popularized for around 200 years, precisely during the triumph, power, and control 
of the Rattanakosin Kingdom in 1782-1932. Masters and the Thai community have 
already addressed the Canal's design, yet the government did not have a project's ultimate 
decision, and the agenda was reported being succumbed and emerged simultaneously. 
During the financial crisis knocked Asia from 1997 to 1998, authorities in several nations 
tried to give resolution through various strategies and ideas for an immediate recovery, 
including the Thai government (Menon, 2018). 
In 1999, Nippon conducted a study by calculating the Canal’s scheme; they 
assumed that ± $20 billion were demanded to perform the construction entirety (not 
including maintenance). Also, by a length of ± 32 miles, this track can cause sovereignty 
obstacles as it could separate several provinces in Northern Thailand and Southern 
Thailand. Even though the estimated capital was considerably high, the issue to give 
birth towards the Canal strongly emerged around the period of the 1990s. The dignitaries 
hoped that this giant infrastructure would support internal economic enthusiasm within 
the country (Billington, 2017). 
According to Sulong (2012), when Thaksin Shinawatra governed, the program to 
bring a breath unto project failed even though he possessed an emphatic answer from 
assembly officials; this happened due to internal problems in the legislative body of 
government (civil and non-civil). Later, after the disclosure for a prime minister came 
out, a change began with the advancement of Yingluck. The wind of revolution over the 
Canal performed an echo among the Thai country executives entirely in 2011. 
Five years later, under the influence of Prayut Chan-O-Cha, problems reappeared, 
and the project’s agenda back into faded. Still, in 2016, someone represented the royal 
committee submitted an opinion about the route’s formation. In response to this request, 
via Lt-Gen Sansern Kaewkamnerd, the government affirmed that the Kra Isthmus Canal 
was not a strategic expansion for Thailand’s virtue (Channel News Asia, 2018). 
Therefore, the response implied that all of the expectations of the Canal’s project did not 
have an audible constitutional basis by the Thai government. However, when Prem 
Tinsulanonda served as Prime Minister in the previous order (1941–1986), several 
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members of the Thai Council welcomed the agenda, and Vajiralongkorn (the King) also 
seemed to provide the same provision. Hence, even though Prayut Chan-O-Cha has now 
asserted to not continue this project during his tenure, with unhesitant support from the 
Royal, anything could be possible to happen (Billington, 2017). 
As given in the following Figure 1, the Canal’s master plan can be a timesaver 
from the Andaman Sea in the Indian Ocean region to the South China Sea (or vice versa). 
This path can be reached without turning to the south towards Singapore/through the 
South Malacca Straits as it is now happening habitually. 
lokal wilayah dari masyarakat menjadi input dan dimasukkan ke dalam peta. 
Partisipasi masyarakat dalam pembuatan peta juga mampu mendorong kemandirian 
penduduk dalam peran sertanya merencanakan pembangunan wilayah yang dituangkan 
dalam peta (Kadir W. dan Jusuf, 2008). Kontrol terhadap pembuatan peta berbasis 
partisipasi dan penggunaan peta dilakukan oleh masyarakat/stakeholder secara langsung. 
Aplikasi dari pembuatan peta partisipatif cukup beragam dan dapat disesuaikan dengan 
tema-tema yang dipilih untuk dituangkan dalam peta partisipatif. Salah satu aplikasi dari 
pembuatan peta partisipatif adalah peta potensi wisata berbasis partisipasi masyarakat 
untuk pengembangan wisata pada satu daerah. 
Maritime Socio-economic 
The function of the Canal is believed to ignite Thailand's potential as a core for 
mobilization and various logistics industries in Southeast Asia. This sophisticated 
infrastructure could strengthen bilateral and multilateral collaboration with incomparably 
higher profits among ASEAN countries. According to a development analysis specialist, 
Pakdee Tanapura, the prompt growth of industry and business could be accelerated by 
functioning the Canal (ASEAN Affairs Magazine, 2009). Every dependable maritime 
mobility can undoubtedly have a meaningful impact. If the Canal progressed maritime 
venture in a concentrated area, later the business and commerce would also come to 
alive. Apart from the advantages that would be gained by Thailand, some other positive 
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Figure 1. The Kra Isthmus Canal Route (Source: National Planning Agency ) 
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impressions would also be absorbed by countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and 
Myanmar (Sulong, 2012). 
In contrast with the maritime pursuits that can trigger economic betterment, 
Thailand has long had sovereignty dilemmas. Some parties in the government’s body 
have doubts about the Canal’s future. If this development split the two parts of the 
country geographically (which would be established across Satun Province and Songkhla 
Province), the probability for Southern Thailand to be officially self-governing would be 
even higher. This anxiety is further reinforced by proof since 1948 when Southern 
Thailand has long had a struggle for seceding, known as South Thailand Insurgency. The 
rebellion happened because of claims that provinces in Southern Thailand such as 
Songkhla, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat lived just like Thai's half-blood.  
Also, some half-truth talks stated that several Muslim nations desire to interrupt 
Thailand and support new sovereignty for Southern Thai, and these hearsays circulated 
among the country for ages. However, many parties also had optimism. They assumed 
that the intimidation of separatism movement could be resolved efficiently with the 
accomplishment of the Canal; hence, proper development and high social welfare would 
have the power to address Thai society expectation (Kinder, 2008). 
In addition to Thailand's constitutional provocations, the hardships undergone to 
establish the Kra Isthmus Canal are also due to the lack of transparency. Society and 
government have no idea about the investors who participated in the outline. For 
example, the titles of several large companies, Liu Gong Group Limited Company, 
Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, and Sany Heavy Industry Limited Company had 
grown into the public and government conversations. However, the news just vanished 
along with those exceptional companies' fame (Lau & Lee, 2016).  
In defending some doubtful news, in 2017, a fresh breeze emerged due to a series 
of meetings by group members of the socio-cultural-economic from China and Thailand 
together with the group of European Business, Economy, and Trade. This association 
raised a formation of the Canal's dormant project. The meeting was then continued in 
2018. Historically said that the construction of the Canal was also supported by spirits of 
Chinese Silk Road’s new life. Through a group of people associated with the Isthmus 
Canal Organization for Thailand, they were trying to make new attempts to bring back 
the Canal’s life. According to some statements, this pathway construction is predicted to 
be completed in 10 years and yet is expected to yield huge earnings. China, as one of the 
superpower countries in Asia, is reportedly ready to become the front supporter in terms 
of financial and infrastructure resources (Menon, 2018). 
Maritime Global Constellation 
The global scale mobility and economic transaction usually use vast ocean’s 
routes for swarming the business, and the Atlantic has long been matured as the 
transcendent marketplace. However, due to the trend changes in the global industrial 
system, the Pacific Ocean, the most massive one in the world, culminated as the center of 
the 21st-century global maritime economy. 
According to Menon (2018), the Canal’s agenda was classified into two outlines. 
The first part is called as the 'Malacca Dilemma'; this path is a quick shortcut from the 
Andaman Sea in the northern part of Sumatra Island to the South China Sea (vice versa). 
Up until now, around three-quarters of oil consumption by China is purchased annually 
through the Straits of Malacca. As the Canal has the potential to offer many efficiencies, 
this track would also be instrumental in breaking the bustle of logistics transportation in 
Southeast Asia. Therefore, these delightful promises have motivated several large 
companies in China to ease the Canal’s realization.  
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The second part is designated as the Special Economic Zones (SEZ). The SEZ 
purposes for maximizing the economic standing in a concentrated region, and the 
economy would be more stable and sustainable with full support in physical facilities. 
Considering the Canal would be becoming a center of business traffic toward countries 
from various parts of the world, implying that this Canal must have an extra advanced 
infrastructure in order to support the business activities as the hub-ports (Menon, 2018). 
Chen and Kumagai (2016), made a simulation by using spatial economics as a 
parameter. The two Japanese researchers succeeded in presenting a formulation that was 
qualified to predict the economic situation in several regions surrounding the Canal. The 
study set three designs, as follows: 
Design-1: the Kra Isthmus Canal and the Straits of Malacca; both are functioning; 
Design-2: the Kra Isthmus Canal; is functioning alone; 
Design-3: the Kra Isthmus Canal, the SEZ, and the Straits of Malacca; all three are 
functioning. 
The time estimation to complete this route was per 2025. In making predictions 
related to economic conditions, the designed of 2030 and the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) were selected as indicators, as shown in Table 1.  
From the above table, several countries represent various continents. As in the 
designs run by the program, East Asia was a particular region that would have received 
the most significant benefits. As shown in design-1, two dominant countries, Japan and 
China, are the leading performers. Profit amounted to $21.5 billion is predicted to be 
achieved by China, then more to the east, the worth of $10.6 billion would cruise to 
Japan.  
The doubled-interest that might be collected by China is based on many forces, 
more to the point is concerning security status. Presently, the Malacca Straits is the only 
business route adored by most countries yet also contains various perils. Usually, threats 
often target countries with weak security systems, but everything can happen in the 
Malacca Straits (theft, accident, and the logistical stoppage). Such miserable track 
records in the Malacca Straits execute China to be very eager in proposing the Kra 
Isthmus Canal. 
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Table 1. Economics Impact by 2030 
Countries Design-1            Design-2        Design-3 




Million $ % of GDP 
China 21508 0,13 17549 0,11 20685 0,13 
Japan 10611 0,08 9212 0,07 10273 0,08 
Korea 3405 0,11 3116 0,10 3219 0,11 
Taiwan 897 0,08 834 0,08 863 0,08 
∑ East Asia 36421   30711   35040   
India 17719 0,22 17996 0,22 17827 0,22 
Australia -250 -0,01 -1208 -0,07 -234 -0,01 
Europe 23431 0,07 23370 0,07 21252 0,07 
The USA -4751 -0,01 -5355 -0,01 -4199 -0,01 
Source: Chen and Kumagai (2016)  
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A scholar, Zhao Yuncheng, also approve some concerns regarding the importance 
of security in the Malacca Straits. He stated that if the situation at sea remained to be 
increasingly unfavorable, the mobilization of crude oil which regularly imported by 
China would receive significant intimidation. When Hu Jintao served as President of the 
People's Republic of China in 2003-2013, he was also striving to accelerate maritime 
security so that sovereignty and a stable economy could be settled in his command. 
China had assumed that some interlopers had a goal to disrupt these aspirations, those 
who intentionally wanted to control the commerce atmosphere in the Indian Ocean (one 
of which was the United States). 
In 2013, right under the authority of Xi Jinping, China had a new policy called 
"One Belt One Road”. This policy seeks to turn on activities that can elevate Chinese 
sovereignty in a more stable direction as an influential country. There are various 
infrastructure development projects: the air force, army, and navy. The projects were 
aggressively assembled and spread throughout diverse regions within the motherland 
proportionally. This policy exclusively focuses on the advancement of China’s intention 
to increase prosperity internally. Various foundations were built such as the Economic 
Belt of the Silk Road (to facilitate mobility towards East Asia, Central Asia, and 
Southeast Asia) and diplomatic sea lanes (to facilitate mobility to Africa, Europe, Persia, 
and Australia). Seeing from the expansion demonstrated by China, the Canal might be 
able to contribute positive impacts significantly. This pathway might become one of the 
legitimate methods for China to be more attached to its target market efficiently. (Menon, 
2018) 
Comparable to China, two developed countries who lead technology in the 
international shipping industry, Japan and Korea, also perceive a beneficial impact that 
the Canal can offer. In the industrial and technological world, time and cost efficiencies 
are a component and determinant of business prosperity. If a lot of time and costs were 
spent on the production cost, then the profit might encounter a deficiency. Therefore, as 
much as $300,000/shipper journey can be cut by Japan without turning around the 
Malacca Straits; so that the presence of a more promising alternative route is deemed 
necessary. By understanding these immense savings, in the mid-1990s, Phuket Pass 
Project Limited received an investment for conducting a research project. The project 
was subsidized by several Japanese companies as a symbol of enthusiasm related to the 
Canal’s topics (Kinder, 2008). 
Impact on ASEAN Countries 
Quoted from ASEAN Affairs Magazine (2009), a historian and also a books' 
contributor, Geoff Wade, stated that Geopolitics in ASEAN would be under the control 
of countries who possess dominant power. They would compete to increase expansion, 
maximize new pathways, and utilize all resources deemed as propitious.  
Furthermore, through the research outcomes conducted by Chen and Kumagai 
(2016), those who are predicted to receive significant advantages would surely show 
positive support exponentially. By the Canal, current mileage would be replaced by a 
shortcut as alternative access. The highest efficiency of mileage might benefit various 
port destinations from the European region to the South China Sea (vice versa), the 
distance can be cut up to 808 miles. Next in sequence is the crossing track for the 
European region and the Andaman Sea to East Asia (vice versa), which can be reached 
with 560 miles shorter. Lastly, the vessels’ travel time can be eliminated up to 435 miles 
to and from the Manila region, the Andaman Sea, and Europe. Meanwhile, either by the 
Canal’s presence or absence, this utopian would not affect Indonesia’s shipping lane 
system in terms of time and distance efficiency.  
Jurnal Pendidikan Geografi: 
Kajian, Teori, dan Praktik dalam Bidang Pendidikan dan Ilmu Geografi 
Volume 25, Nomor 1, Jan 2020, Hal 39-53 
46 
The straits situated in several countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore have been the primary access for maritime transportation in the Southeast Asia 
region. The Malacca Straits entrance exposes various commercial activities to and from 
Southeast Asia and East Asia regions and also bridges the South China Sea, Andaman 
Sea, Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean. For ages, besides passing Malacca Straits, oil 
and other vital commodities also transported through the Lombok Straits and the Sunda 
Straits. Considering that sea mobilization is one of the most favorable access for most 
countries, cross-border security, accessibility, and convenience aspects should have 
infinite attention among neighboring countries (Ho, 2006). 
In the present, every shipping from the East Asia region to the Indian Ocean 
typically has to turn around/stop by Singapore. However, if the Kra Isthmus Canal 
existed in the world, this path would indirectly defeat the busy vessels’ movement in the 
Southeast Asia region. As a result of this transmutation, the activities of several great 
nations such as the United States, China, and India would experience territories 
fluctuations; they have to strive more for power and influence in the economic, social, 
cultural, and political battlegrounds (Sulong, 2012). 
Following are the research’s results conducted by Chen and Kumagai (2016), it 
appears that a few of ASEAN countries would gain benefit through the design-1 and 
design-3 significantly. In contrast, many countries in the design-2 would experience 
setbacks but Thailand.  
Countries in the Malacca Straits 
Still pointing to Table 3 above, Singapore might bear losses up to $371 million if 
the design-1 was implemented. At the same time, Malaysia, and Brunei would also 
experience a loss of $130 million and $9 million respectively. As explained earlier, the 
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Table 2. The Element Comparison between the Malacca Straits and the Kra Isthmus Canal 
Elements The Malacca Straits The Kra Isthmus Canal 
Distance ± 464 miles longer ± 464 miles shorter 
Time Up to five days delayed Could save up to five days 
Security Low Chance of rising Thailand separatist 
aggression 
Cost Less economical Could save up to ± $350,000 
Level of activity Overcrowded No data available (could be a new 




Restricted (limited) Unrestricted (open) 
Accident track 
record 
High Can be a new option to lessen colli-
sions in the Malacca Straits 
Dimension cov-
erage 
± 500 miles of length, ± 40-155 miles of 
width, 44 yards of depth 
Two passages, ± 63 miles of length, 
± 437 yards of width and ± 27 yards 
of depth 
Elements The Malacca Straits The Kra Isthmus Canal 
Pollution High Will harm the marine ecosystem due 
to excavation activity 
Coverage area In three countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Singapore) 
Full in Thai supremacy. 
Vessels coverage Adjusted to the area of the Malacca Straits Ultra Large Crude Carrier (ULCC) 
   
Source: Rahman et al. (2016) 
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Malacca Straits is a gateway and helping various countries in Southeast Asia to get 
international trade exposures, so it was also told to have high impacts for Indonesia. If 
the design-2 was applied, a loss amounted to $11.7 billion would frighten Indonesia due 
to the Malacca Straits inactivity. Still, in design-2, Singapore and Malaysia would also 
suffer huge losses, each totaling $7.1 billion and $2.1 billion. Then in design-3, 
Singapore will suffer the most losses amounting to $353 million compared to other 
countries in ASEAN, followed by Malaysia and Indonesia, amounted to $85 million and 
$83 million respectively. 
From a study conducted by Rahman et al. (2016), the behavior of the Canal 
would later have two faces towards Malaysia, especially on social and economic aspects. 
At present, Malaysia has three main ports for driving their maritime economy, the Klang 
Port, Johor Port, and Tanjung Pelepas Port. In case the Kra Isthmus Canal was 
functioning, vessels traffic in the Malacca Straits could be decreased. Reducing the 
number of vessels passing around could reduce the loading and unloading intensity of 
numerous logistics. The accumulation of these difficulties might result in the weakening 
of Malaysia's socio-economic, and a high rate of unemployment might occur due to low 
job opportunities in the ports area. However, one port occupied by Malaysia still has 
optimism, the Port of Penang which is directly adjacent to the Malacca Straits gate; and 
is expected to become Malaysia's main port for facing the international sea revolution in 
the present and the future. 
In the meantime, there has been no explicit legislative brushoff from some of 
Thailand's neighboring countries (Indonesia and Malaysia) concerning the Kra Isthmus 
Canal. However, Singapore gives natural defense as they have long been performing as 
the center of various international shipping industries. The presence of new contender in 
the port lane sector is predicted to threaten the level of logistics transactions that have 
been circulating in the Malacca Straits, specifically for Singapore. Supported by a very 
strategic location, this country is a very active international-scale transit spot for both air 
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Table 3. The Economics Impact in Southeast Asia by 2030 
Countries 
Design-1 Design-2 Design-3 
Million $ %  GDP Million $ % GDP Million $ % GDP 
Indonesia -98 0 -11660 -0,33 -83 0 
Malaysia -130 -0,01 -2029 -0,21 -85 -0,01 
Singapore -371 -0,04 -7027 -0,83 -353 -0,04 
Thailand 2703 0,18 2742 0,18 4244 0,28 
The Philippines 382 0,04 359 0,03 389 0,04 
Brunei -9 -0,04 -111 -0,51 -8 -0,04 
Cambodia 8 0,02 9 0,02 9 0,02 
Laos 2 0,01 2 0,01 2 0,01 
Myanmar 9 0,01 9 0,01 9 0,01 
Vietnam 484 0,09 486 0,09 491 0,09 
∑ ASEAN 10 2980 0,03 -17.221 -0,20 4615 0,05 
Source: Chen and Kumagai (2016) 
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and sea transportation. The threat by a new alternative route could have a substantial and 
permanent unwanted impact if Singapore does not adapt promptly. As a country with an 
area approximately 278 square miles, Port of Singapore is well known as the second 
busiest port in the world after the Port of Shanghai. Therefore, the economic life of this 
"lion country" is very dependent on cross-sea trading activities. 
The reason that relies upon the Canal is not merely on the budget and time 
efficiency but also security. Several countries who support the system of the Kra Isthmus 
Canal used speculation concerning security dilemmas. On the other hand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore have arguments corresponding all of those understatements. As 
a group of countries who frequently has a multilateral partnership, these countries have 
evidence through the "Straits of Malacca Coordinated Patrols" for sounding that the 
Malacca Straits security is getting more reliable. 
Mainland Indochina Countries 
According to Boot (2012), connections between developing countries in mainland 
Indochina had never been separated from constant intercommunications and synergies in 
all courses. Businesses that are usually transported in Southeast Asia must undeviatingly 
intersect the surrounding neighbors. For a simple instance, Vietnam; if Vietnam desires 
to do business with Myanmar, these two countries must first travel encompassing 
Singapore and voluntarily arriving into contact with Indonesia and Malaysia.  
However, if the Kra Isthmus Canal were functioning, this practice would no 
longer be legitimate. The ambition to accelerate the advancement of coastal cities is 
revealed by Myanmar and Thailand's efforts related to international port development 
proposals in Dawei, Tanintharyi. Therefore, the foundation of the Kra Isthmus Canal 
would be indirectly linear with Myanmar’s government purposes to more actively hasten 
the germination of integrated economic zones (BBC News Asia-Pacific, 2011). 
Similarly, Vietnam's neighbor who is also consolidated in the Indochina 
mainland, Laos—is currently progressing in the international shipping industry, and is 
predicted to gain success in the arena of international trade. Because of being flanked by 
Thailand and Vietnam, this setting lets Laos not to have an entire sea route. Thailand and 
Laos have a high socio-economic kinship and also sea contract (exports and imports). 
Consequently, Thailand would be very bustling when the Kra Isthmus Canal was 
functioning, and Laos would also hold a meaningful breakthrough in various sectors 
(Kinder, 2008). 
Impact on Indonesia 
Technically speaking, the Canal’s behavior is considered to have crucial impacts 
both positively and negatively. In response to this matter, Indonesia was not risking and 
submissive, yet trying to set endurance to face any possible contemporary chaotic in the 
modern maritime revolution. Under the authority of President Joko Widodo, Indonesia 
has possessed Law Number 16 of 2017 concerning Maritime Policy. This policy aims to 
strengthen the principle of Indonesia as the world's maritime fulcrum. Today, the 
application of the maritime fulcrum concept is not yet excellently established; it can be 
seen as the development orientation in the shipping industry is still dominantly 
concentrated on the national level. Some commentators of international policy perceive 
that sea toll plan for reducing uneven developments is an "inward-looking" only (Negara 
& Das, 2017).  
At present, the 'sea toll' is one of the most intensified progress in Indonesia's 
development, and is expected to connect various major destinations from the western 
edges to the eastern borders. Development that is still being centered on a local scale 
Jurnal Pendidikan Geografi: 
Kajian, Teori, dan Praktik dalam Bidang Pendidikan dan Ilmu Geografi 
Volume 25, Nomor 1, Jan 2020, Hal 39-53 
49 
becomes a shred of evidence that inequitable distribution existed in industry and 
transportation sectors continuously. Also, some parties under the president’s 
administration expressed misgivings against Joko Widodo’s insufficient understandings 
in political negotiation and diplomacy (Connelly, 2015).   
Regarding the Canal’s negative impact that might against Indonesia, the Ministry 
of Maritime Coordinator for 2015-2016, Indroyono Soesilo, stated that 90% of 
Indonesia’s local logistics chains are still crossing through the Makassar Straits. 
Accordingly, if the Malacca Straits were experiencing a decline in transactional intensity, 
the Kra Isthmus Canal’s lopsided agenda would not have meaningful power in 
threatening Indonesia’s economic environment significantly. Indonesia is a vast country 
in terms of dimensions and population; all export and import activities must be 
determined by household demand and supply.  
During this time, the famous international logistics route in Indonesia must cross 
through the Makassar Straits - Malacca Straits, such as from Japan, China, South Korea, 
East Africa, West Africa, Europe, and America. The data presented in Table 4 below 
shows that the engagement of Indonesia's sea transportation with Europe, the Indian 
Ocean, and the Andaman Sea would increasingly have a long-distance if vessels 
followed the Canal’s path; the route that must be taken is way longer to reach Indonesia 
and vice versa.  
Hence, the presence of this shadowed-infrastructure has no vital meaning for 
Indonesia's shipping industry. From the overhead concept, it can be inferred that 
Indonesia’s constitutional arrangements are way more thoughtful than Thailand as they 
are still struggling with just a development strategy. Therefore, Indonesia is expected to 
certainly be prepared to anticipate some other unwanted events that may befall in the 
future.  
Based on The Presidential Regulation Number 37 on the International Route-
policy (2002), Indonesia is a large country, complete with its intricate sea lanes. Five 
routes (straits) are usually traversed if have vessels desired to conduct trades around 
Indonesia, namely the Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits, Makassar Straits, Lombok Straits, 
and Ombai-Wetar Straits. Moreover, the existing sea lanes in Indonesia are already 
congested by domestic and international sea traffic (Rustam, 2016). The following are 
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Table 4. Distance between Jakarta to Major Foreign Ports 






Jakarta Rotterdam Indonesia-Dutch 16969 16483 23% 
Jakarta Yangon Indonesia-
Myanmar 
3531 3045 16% 
Chittagong Jakarta Bangladesh-
Indonesia 
4271 3785 12% 
Jakarta Chennai Indonesia-India 4399 3913 12% 
Jakarta Colombo Indonesia-Sri 
Lanka 
4462 3976 12% 
Mumbai Jakarta India-Indonesia 6001 5515 9% 
Jakarta Laem Cha-
bang 
Indonesia-Thailand 2886 2428 19% 
Source: Chen and Kumagai (2016) 
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some thoughts that determine as to why the Canal's proposal is considered to have an 
insignificant force on Indonesia's aspiration to become the world's maritime fulcrum. 
1. Indonesia's extensive sea is a hectic international trade market, so the presence of the 
Kra Isthmus Canal does not necessarily change Indonesia's long-established business 
route. ALKI (Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lane) is a legal outcome of UNCLOS '82 
and has long become the basis for archipelagic sea lane concept following the 
recognition of the Juanda Declaration in the international reputation; Indonesia 
established three sea lanes, namely ALKI I, ALKI II, ALKI III (sub-ALKI III B, 
ALKI III C, ALKI III D, and ALKI III E). 
2. Currently, under the power of Joko Widodo, Indonesia is very active in implementing 
sea tolls both in terms of infrastructure and human resources. Indonesia's domestic 
marine ventures are still sharpened in national-level activities where 90% of the 
shipping industry still passes through the Makassar Straits. Therefore, this Canal’s 
unfixed-ambition would not have such a considerable power on Indonesia's internal 
business market. 
According to Ramli (2014), with further examination, the Kra Isthmus Canal 
would also be advantageous for Indonesia in the future. Here are the root aspects: 
1. From an environmental perspective, the hazard of pollution received by Indonesia so 
far is quite substantial due to the vessels traffic in the Malacca Straits. Therefore, 
when the body's mobilization in the Straits of Malacca cracked down by the Kra 
Isthmus Canal, the deterioration and vessel collisions would become minor trouble; 
2. There are two major ports in Sumatra Island, Sabang Port and Kuala Tanjung Port. 
Since these ports are quite close to the Canal’s agenda. By optimizing these harbors, 
they can stimulate economic movements and provide employment opportunities for 
residents; 
3. The Canal could be giving Jakarta more force to rival Singapore. By the emergence 
of the Canal, Singapore's activities would be declining; this could become a prospect 
for Jakarta to standing up more on the ASEAN global economic cycle. 
Currently, the world is facing the industrial revolution of 4.0. Various classes of 
challenges for Indonesia to overlook in the maritime perspective must be investigated 
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Figure 2. Indonesia’s Sea Toll Scheme (Source: National Planning Agency ) 
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immediately. Responding to these challenges, Indonesian Geographers formulated 
strategies and policies to clarify the basis/uniqueness of the archipelago geo-maritime 
concept into eight sections as formulated in the book of Paradigma Geomaritim 
Indonesia (2018): 
1. Embrace characters of Indonesia's geography (formation and strategic location) as the 
basis for managing archipelago resources; 
2. Promote the principle of sustainable ecotourism for maritime resources based on 
national sea spatial planning; 
3. Internationalize the principle of the world's maritime fulcrum to a stronger global 
spotlight; 
4. Grant equal proportions to the development and human resources for national 
prosperity in various ports; the Western group (Indian access), the East-North group 
(Pacific access), and the Ausindo group (access for Australia & New Zealand); 
5. Execute an integration between the port and management partnership (core-hinterland 
system both on land and sea); 
6. Prepare foreign diplomacy strategies by promoting Indonesia's maritime culture; 
7. Implement maritime-based education for the quality of human resources; and 
8. Prioritize geospatial and information system technology for maritime development 
studies. 
In order to correctly run the maritime strategies and policies that have been 
arranged beforehand, anticipatory steps (port infrastructure) to deal with increased 
intercontinental trade need to be settled. Indonesia needs to develop various ports to 
international quality, from the western edges (Aceh, Medan, and Jakarta) to the eastern 
borders of Indonesia (Makassar, Sorong, and Surabaya). Also, to anticipate vessels traffic 
originating from the northern and southern part (the Pacific Ocean and the Indian 
Ocean), an efficient design must be given more attention to the east part of Indonesia 
(Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, and Nusa Tenggara East). This scheme could be 
tackling all transactions traveled to and from the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Timor Leste. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that the Kra Isthmus Canal might contribute a more efficient route is 
promising, but also this advantage can only impress some regions in East Asia, in 
mainland Southeast Asia (especially Indochina), and the Indian Ocean. Hence, Indonesia 
should take immediate precautions by developing infrastructure and human resources in 
key and strategic trade areas. Furthermore, Indonesia can further be empowering 
maritime safety and security thoroughly by strengthening ALKI I, ALKI II, and ALKI 
III. By then, the Canal might have no harmful influence or become nightmares for 
Indonesia's aspiration to be the world's maritime fulcrum. In light of the above 
mentioned, some preventive steps are required to answer all possible challenges in the 
future. Considering the Malacca Straits also always exhibit an upward trend day by day, 
many alternatives and possibilities are unquestionably needed—including the Kra 
Isthmus Canal—coming to earth. 
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